decision, Lady Hale found that 'Civil partnership is not called marriage but in almost every other respect it is indistinguishable from the status of marriage in United Kingdom law'. 25 Unlike marriage weddings, however, civil partnership weddings were initially constructed as purely civil. The standard procedure for creation of a civil partnership required the signing of a civil partnership document in the presence, inter alia, of a civil partnership registrar. 26 As with the routes to civil marriage outlined above, ' [n]o religious service is to be used while the civil partnership registrar is officiating at the signing of a civil partnership document'. 27 The wedding could, with an important exception discussed below, happen in a place approved by the registration authority, which could also provide a place in its area for the registration of civil partnerships.
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It is significant to note that there was no religious route for the creation of a civil partnership, a position which survived the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in relation to the provision of goods and services. 29 The provisions allowing marriage by the usages of the Church of England, Society of Friends, and Jews, were not extended to civil partnerships. Strikingly, the more general provisions concerning the certified place of worship were expressly excluded from the legislation. Registration of a civil partnership is formally separate from any ceremony, 30 but the separation between civil partnership registration and religious ceremony was reinforced by a separate rule that registration may not take place in religious premises.
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Civil partnerships, then, were constructed as a form of especially secularised civil ceremony.
Specifically religious ceremonies were excluded from the process, as with civil marriage, but without the possibility of religious routes. This exclusion of religion was deliberate:
[O]pposite-sex couples can opt for a religious or civil marriage ceremony as they choose, whereas civil partnership is an exclusively civil procedure. The government has been very clear throughout the process that it has no plans to bring in same sex marriage. and same sex couples sought access to marriage. 35 The 2011 amendment to the law had itself begun to recognise that the complete exclusion of religion from civil partnerships should not be maintained.
In 2012 the Home Office consulted on extending marriage to same sex couples. It received over 228,000 responses. The concept was rejected by bodies such as the Coalition for Marriage, the Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Church of England, the Muslim Council of Britain, and the Evangelical Alliance as misunderstanding the nature of marriage, which was exclusively heterosexual.
The Government proposed to enable same sex couples to have a civil marriage, and to permit religious organisations that wished to conduct same sex marriages to do so, but with explicit protection for religious organisations and clergy that did not wish to do so; 36 and to retain civil partnerships for same sex couples only, but allow existing civil partnerships to be converted to From the perspective of a supporter of same sex marriage, a distinction between civil partnership and marriage was a violation of equality norms because it treated similarly placed persons differently. Love rights are love rights regardless of the gender of the loving, and former distinctions between opposite sex and same sex unions needed to be recognised as arbitrary discrimination and removed. Even if civil partnership and marriage were identical in every way except nomenclature and sexual polarity, this would still constitute discrimination. By excluding same sex couples from marriage the law carried the message that the relationship was less authentic -in the words of pivotal former law, a 'pretended family relationship'. 54 It sought to police a separation between the modern era and the past, severing same sex couples from their family traditions of marriage, which would typically emerge from an opposite sex couple. 55 While it was acceptable to allow religious organisations and people some space to set their values against equality norms here, by not requiring them to provide religious marriage services to same sex couples, religious organisations could not exercise a monopoly over the definition of marriage. As one commentator has put it, '[t]he law cannot, and probably should not attempt to, change the doctrinal understandings of such religious bodies -but nor may it reflect such understandings in its own rules' (Norrie 2011: 98-9).
From the perspective of an opponent of same sex marriage, a distinction between civil partnership and marriage respected equality norms because it treated differently placed persons differently. While it was important to ensure that people of all sexual orientations were treated decently, for instance by according the incidents of civil partnerships to those who enter into them, same sex and opposite sex relationships were not the same. 56 In particular, marriage was intrinsically liberalisation of the law concerning registration of places of worship in Hodkin, religious communities sufficiently well-resourced to be able to operate a place of worship are largely able, if they choose, to access a route to marry. Religious communities which are not so placed cannot. Additionally, there is some evidence that the distinction between purely religious marriage, and legal marriage, is not recognised with equal clarity across different communities (see Douglas 2011). The removal of legal effect from all religious weddings, regardless of the access of a community to a registered place of worship which carries out legal marriages, would simplify and equalise the legal consequences of religious wedding.
In relation to the argument from religious freedom, the state has a strong interest in determining the content of its partnership law, and inevitably this will be in accord with its fundamental values. Within a religiously plural state, the issue then arises of how it is to deal with communities whose values conflict. Within a coproduction model, there is a distinction between religious communities whose values are sufficiently aligned to allow coproduction, and those who are not. The potential for entanglement between religion and state is high. Removing legal effect from religious weddings removes this potential, and allows religious communities to shape marriage without the influence of legal recognition for particular shapings. It may be argued, however, that removing legal effect actually reduces religious liberty in two ways -the liberty of religious organisations who want their religious ceremonies to have legal effect in state law, and the liberty of a marrying couple who want their religious ceremony to have this effect. I have already suggested that a state demand to confer a religious ceremony is unlikely to succeed on religious liberty grounds; the same approach suggests that a religious demand for conferment of particular state benefits through a religious ceremony is also unlikely to succeed.
One issue arising from this 'civil partnerships for all' approach is how to articulate religious wedding, which will create in the religious law or understandings of the community a marriage, nissuin, zawadj and the like; with the civil partnership ceremony which will create a legal civil partnership. This concern with articulation is not particularly novel. In Australia, the Commonwealth's current Marriage Act includes provision for allowing a legal marriage to be followed by a second 'religious ceremony of marriage', which is predicated upon the proving of the legal marriage. 63 There are a number of possible forms of articulation, the simplest being none whatsoever -couples are free to carry out whatever religious ceremonies they wish, which are completely immaterial to the legal creation of a civil partnership. Another is to allow some degree of It may also be argued that the term 'marriage' should remain a state possession, and that the state giving up this property is not a neutral way of resolving the (religious) disputes as to definition of marriage which have characterised the current debate. There is some strength in this. Advocating a removal of a legal position is not the same as advocating that such a legal position should not be adopted. Marriage at the moment clearly is a legal institution, and changing that will not satisfy those who wish to use state power to resolve the definitional arguments.
More concretely, it may also be argued that there is a legal right to marriage, 66 as opposed to civil partnership. In practice, arguments which engage with this frequently move between a right to marriage per se, and the discrimination inherent in some couples being able to marry and others not, with the emphasis on the latter. A good example is the witness statement of Susan Wilkinson, who sought to have her Canadian marriage to another woman recognised as a marriage, rather than a civil partnership. 67 She argued that she did not wish her relationship to be recognised as a civil partnership:
it is simply not acceptable to be asked to pretend that this marriage is a civil partnership.
While marriage remains open to heterosexual couples only, offering the 'consolation prize' of a civil partnership to lesbians and gay men is offensive and demeaning. Marriage is our society's fundamental social institution for recognising the couple relationship and access to this institution is an equal rights issue … to have our relationship denied that symbolic status devalues it relative to the relationships of heterosexual couples. The ECHR has been reluctant to intervene too closely in national marriage law, as we see in B&L v UK for instance, where the Court states that :
Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law and given the sensitive moral choices concerned and the importance attached to the protection of children and the fostering of secure family environments, this court must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of the authorities that are best place to assess and respond to the needs of society. 69 Nonetheless, Article 12 has some effect, and would prevent a state imposing some bans on marriage.
In Goodwin, 70 for instance, the court found 'no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying minister, Jacquie Smith, was pressed on whether the government supported same sex marriage. She replied:
I recognise that many hon. Members on both sides of the House understand and feel very strongly about specific religious connotations of marriage. The Government are taking a secular approach to resolve the specific problems of same sex couples. As others have said, that is the appropriate and modern way for the 21 st century.
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If I can remove 'same sex' from her words, and look to treat both same sex and opposite sex couples the same in law, then we are in agreement. 75 Hansard HC vol 425(35), col 177 (12 October 2004).
